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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:

CASPER MICHAEL DUNKEL, III,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

CaSe N

°

20040875CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from a conviction based upon a guilty plea to operation of a
clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 &
-5 (West 2004), which plea was conditioned upon defendant's right to appeal the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress. Jurisdiction exists pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j) (West 2004) (pour-over provision).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. May defendant, who conditionally pled guilty, go beyond the terms of the
conditional plea agreement and challenge the lawfulness of the traffic stop for the first time
on appeal?
A guilty plea waives all pre-plea constitutional challenges unless defendant expressly
reserves the right to challenge a pretrial ruling and the prosecutor and trial court agree to the
reservation. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1990); Utah R. Crim. P.

11 (i). Waiver of an issue is presumed unless defendant conclusively establishes that the issue
raised on appeal was included within the conditional plea agreement. See Bobo, 803 P.2d
at 1271.
2. Did the trial court correctly find that defendant had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in a container after he affirmatively disavowed its ownership and control?
Whether a defendant manifests a subjective expectation of privacy when he disclaims
ownership of and authority over an object is a factual determination, which is reviewed only
for clear error. See United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 1570,1573(ll th Cir. 1988). Accord
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936-39 & n.4 (Utah 1994) (recognizing that factual findings are
accorded deference on appeal and only overturned if clearly erroneous).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The complete text of the following determinative provisions are included in
Addendum A, together with any provision cited in argument:
Utah R. Crim. P. ll(i) - With the approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional guilty plea, guilty and
mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial
motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the
plea.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV - The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 2002, defendant was charged by information with the operation of a
clandestine laboratory (R. 1-2 & 13-14). Defendant waived preliminary hearing and was
bound over for trial (R. 9-10).
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized from the trunk of his
vehicle (R. 23-26). In the motion and in a subsequent evidentiary hearing, defendant stated
that he was not challenging the validity of the stop or the voluntariness of his consent to
search (R. 23-23; R122: 34 & 38). Instead, defendant argued that he limited or revoked his
prior consent when he claimed that the container found in his truck belonged to a friend (R.
23-26; R122: 34-44,50-51). The prosecutor argued that defendant's denial of ownership did
not revoke his consent, but that the affirmative disclaimer negated defendant's legitimate
expectation of privacy in the container (R. 28-33; R122: 46-49). The trial court denied the
motion to suppress (R. 35-38). See Addendum B (Memorandum Decision). The court found
that defendant's statement, "I do not own the container. The container belongs to a friend.
I cannot give permission to search it," meant no more than that because defendant "does not
own the container, he cannot give permission to search it. The defendant is claiming he does
not have authority from the owner to grant the search" (R. 36). Consequently, the court
found that the disclaimer did not limit or revoke defendant's prior consent to search (id.).
Alternatively, the court found that "defendant does not have standing to suppress the contents

3

of the container because the defendant claims he doesn't own the container" (R. 36-37).l
On October 24, 2003, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to operating a
clandestine laboratory and, with the agreement of the prosecutor and approval of the trial
court, reserved his right "to appeal the court's ruling on defendant's motion to suppress" (R.
47-53). See Addendum C (Plea Agreement). On March 31,2004, defendant was sentenced
to the statutory term of five-years-to-life imprisonment (R. 74).
Defendant failed to timely appeal. Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction
relief, claiming that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal (R.
85-88). The post-conviction petition was granted and on September 8,2004, defendant was
resentenced nunc pro tunc (R. 92). On October 7, 2004, defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal (R. 95). The appeal was subsequently poured over to this Court (R. 102).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Around 8: 30 p.m. on October 11,2002, Deputy Weber County Sheriff Steve Haney
was driving his sheriffs vehicle eastbound on 1200 South Street in Ogden, Utah (R122:5-6).
He observed a car traveling "pretty fast" down a freeway off-ramp which exited onto 1200
South (id.). According to the deputy's report, the car stopped at the stop sign (R122: 14 &
18).2 The car then proceeded into the intersection without yielding to on-coming traffic and
*The term "standing" is incorrect. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88
(1998) (recognizing that after Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-30 (1978), the correct
terminology is "legitimate expectation of privacy").
2

At the suppression hearing, the deputy testified that the car rolled through the
stop, but after being shown his report which stated that the car stopped at the stop sign
before proceeding, the deputy accepted the accuracy of the report over his memory
(R122: 5-6, 13-14 & 18).
4

almost hit the deputy's vehicle (R122: 5-6, 13-14 & 18). The deputy was forced to take
evasive action by hitting his brakes and changing lanes to avoid being pushed into a third
vehicle (id.).
Deputy Haney pulled the car over for failing to yield the right of way (R122: 18).
Defendant was the driver and only occupant (R122: 6). The officer asked to see defendant's
driver's license and vehicle registration (R122:7). The deputy—who was a drug recognition
expert—immediately noticed that defendant was impaired (R122:7- 8). Defendant was "very
lethargic, he had - he spoke very thick tongued, his eyes seemed droopy and he seemed
disoriented" (R122: 7-8 & 15-16). When defendant attempted to retrieve the license and
registration, he was "very slow' and "seemed very confused" (id.).
In the past, the deputy had observed these symptoms only in persons under the
influence of alcohol and/or drugs (R122: 15). Because defendant did not smell of alcohol,
the deputy believed defendant was under the influence of drugs (R122:7). The deputy asked
defendant if he had recently consumed drugs (R122: 7-8). Defendant claimed that he had
only ingested Xanax earlier in the day (R122: 7-9).
Deputy Haney asked defendant to exit the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests
(R122: 7). About this time, Deputy Butler passed by and stopped to assist (R122: 9 & 20).
Because defendant told Deputy Haney that he had leg and back problems, the deputy selected
special field tests which he felt would not be affected by defendant's physical injuries (R122:
7-9 & 16). Defendant failed the three tests (R122: 7-9).

5

Based on his belief that defendant was impaired, Deputy Haney asked defendant if he
could search the vehicle for drugs (R122: 7-9). Defendant consented without limitation
(R122:9&21). 3
Deputy Haney searched the interior of the vehicle and then used the vehicle's key to
open the truck of the vehicle (R122: 9-10 & 17). Defendant did not object (R122: 18 & 23).4
A large blue plastic container, about two feet by three feet, was inside the truck (R122: 10).
Deputy Haney said out loud, "What's in this?" or "What do we have here?" (R122: 10, 30).
Defendant responded, "I don't know" or "I'm not sure" (R122: 10,18, 30). Defendant then
volunteered, "It's my friend's. I can't give you permission to search it" (R122: 30; R. 36).
The deputy opened the unlocked container and observed equipment and other objects
associated with a clandestine laboratory (R122: 11). Defendant was arrested (R122: 21).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Stop. A conditional guilty plea does not permit a defendant to raise a new issue
on appeal, which was not ruled upon by the trial court nor specifically reserved in the plea
agreement. Here, defendant did not challenge the validity of the traffic stop below. Nor did
the prosecutor and trial judge consent to the inclusion of this issue in the conditional plea
agreement. Consequently, defendant may not challenge the validity of the stop for the first
time on appeal.
3

Defendant concedes the voluntariness of his consent (R. 24; R122: 34 & 38).

4

Defendant concedes that his consent extended to the truck of the vehicle (R122:
34 & 38). See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (recognizing that
authorization to search a vehicle extends to any place in the vehicle capable of containing
the object of the search).
6

Even if defendant had preserved a challenge to the traffic stop, the issue is without
merit. The undisputed evidence establishes that regardless of whether defendant stopped at
the stop sign, he subsequently failed to properly yield to on-coming traffic and nearly hit a
police vehicle. The deputy who stopped defendant was the same deputy whose vehicle was
almost hit. Consequently, the record amply supports the legitimacy of the stop.
Expectation of Privacy. Defendant clearly had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in his vehicle. Normally, this expectation would extend to objects found inside the vehicle.
But where, as here, defendant affirmatively disavows knowledge, ownership, and/or
authority over the found object, he has no legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents.
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's finding that defendant's affirmative
disclaimer negated a finding of privacy. Defendant fails, however, to marshal the facts in
support of the finding and then demonstrate its clear error. Consequently, defendant's
challenge may be summarily rejected. Even if the merits are considered, the evidence
establishes that defendant affirmatively disclaimed ownership and authority at the scene and
stood by his disclaimer in the suppression hearing. These facts are sufficient to support the
trial court's finding that defendant's mere possession of the container did not establish his
legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents.
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
POINTI
THE CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT DOES NOT
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO CHALLENGE THE TRAFFIC STOP FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
"A voluntary guilty plea is a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues,
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938
(Utah App. 1988). Only one exception exists to the guilty plea waiver rule: a defendant may
condition his guilty plea upon his right to challenge a specific adverse pretrial ruling. See
id. at 939. See also State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268,1271 (Utah App. 1990). Therightto enter
a conditional plea is limited:
With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may
enter a conditional guilty plea .. . reserving in the record the right, on appeal
from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified
pre-trial motion.
Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i). See Add. Afar complete rule. Consequently, if a defendant seeks
appellate review pursuant to a conditional plea, he must conclusively demonstrate not only
that a conditional plea was entered into with the agreement of the prosecution and the
approval of the court, but also which specific adverse rulings were reserved for appeal in the
agreement. See State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, K 3 & n.3, 57 P.3d 238; Bobo, 803 P.2d
at 1271.
Here, defendant concedes that his conditional guilty plea reserved only the right to
appeal the trial court's April 25, 2003 denial of defendant's motion to suppress. See Brief
of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 2. See also Add. C (Plea Agreement). The trial court's denial
8

addressed only two issues: (1) defendant's claim that his disclaimer of ownership limited or
revoked his prior consent to search and (2) the prosecutor's claim that defendant's disclaimer
negated any legitimate expectation of privacy in the container (R. 35-38). See Add. B
(Ruling).
Nevertheless, defendant now challenges the constitutionality of the traffic stop for the
first time on appeal. See Br.Aplt at 2 & Point I. Not only was this issue not reserved by the
conditional plea agreement, defendant expressly waived any challenge to the stop in his
motion to suppress:
For purposes of this motion, the Defendant's argument will be confined to
issues relating to events that occurred subsequent to the stop. However,
Defendant does not concede the legality of the stop. If testimony is offered
that calls into question the legality of the stop, Defendant respectfully requests
an opportunity to argue the issue and/or submit a supplemental memorandum.
(R. 23 n.l). See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ffif 13-14, 95 P.3d 276 (discussing what
constitutes waiver).
Defendant concedes his challenge to the traffic stop is not preserved by the plea
agreement, but presumes he still may raise it if he demonstrates plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Br.Aplt. at 2 & Point L Plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel are exceptions applicable to the general preservation rule imposed in appeals from
general verdicts. See State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, | 4, 46 P.3d 230. Defendant cites no
authority which permits superimposing these exceptions to the general preservation rule on
to rule 1 Ts limited conditional plea exception to the guilty plea waiver rule.
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Indeed, the plain language of rule 11 precludes consideration of unpreserved issues
in a conditional plea appeal. See Utah R. Crim. P. ll(i) (permitting reservation only of
"specified pre-trial" adverse rulings agreed to by the prosecutor and approved of by the trial
court). Moreover, the policy supporting conditional pleas also precludes imposition of
additional exceptions. See Norris, 2002 UT App 305, f 3 & n.2 (recognizing that judicial
economy supports conditional pleas, but also compels strict construction of a plea agreement
to prevent a defendant from raising unpreserved and unreserved issues).
But even if this appeal were from a general verdict and the merits of defendant's
arguments considered, there is no evidentiary support for defendant's claims of plain error
and ineffective assistance of counsel.
During the suppression hearing, Deputy Haney initially testified that defendant rolled
through the stop sign (R122: 5-6 & 13). After being confronted with his report, the deputy
acknowledged that the report was more accurate than his memory and that the report said
defendant stopped at the stop sign (R122: 14 & 18). Defendant extrapolates from this
discrepancy that no reasonable suspicion supported the stop. See Br.Aplt. at 14-17.
Defendant further argues that his trial counsel was ineffective and the trial court plainly erred
in not addressing the discrepancy. See id. at 18-24.
The record establishes, however, that defense counsel was aware of the discrepancy
and explored it on cross-examination (R122:14). Counsel then used the discrepancy to argue
that the deputy's memory might also be faulty concerning the exact words of defendant's
disclaimer (Rl22: 35 & 50). The prosecutor pointed out that the deputy was not testifying
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from memory concerning the disclaimer, but quoting from his report (R122:47). In any case,
whether or not defendant stopped at the stop sign was irrelevant because defendant was not
stopped for a stop sign violation, but for his failure to yield to on-coming traffic in the
intersection (R122: 18). Moreover, when defendant testified at the suppression hearing, he
admitted that he was confused at the intersection and claimed that when stopped, he
immediately apologized for the near-accident (R122: 31-32). Consequently, the record
provides no evidentiary basis to challenge the validity of the stop.
In sum, the conditional plea agreement did not reserve the right to challenge the traffic
stop. But even if this were not a conditional guilty plea appeal, the record evidence fully
supports the validity of the stop.
POINTII
DEFENDANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN A CONTAINER FOUND IN HIS
CAR WHEN HE DISCLAIMED OWNERSHIP AND AUTHORITY TO
CONSENT TO ITS SEARCH AT THE SCENE AND AT THE
SUPPRESSION HEARING
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not objects or places. See Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128,133-34 (1978); Katzv. UnitedStates,389'U.S. 347,351 (1967). To claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, a person must manifest a subjective intent to keep his
possessions private, which intent must be objectively reasonable. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143
n.12. Even when an expectation of privacy exists, a person may forfeit that expectation
through his words, actions, or conduct. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,3940 (1988) (refusing to recognize any Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the contents of
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a trash can left curbside). Indeed, it is well-recognized that when a defendant disavows
ownership or knowledge of an item before the item is searched, the affirmative disclaimer
"ends a legitimate expectation of privacy in that item." See United States v. Hawkins, 681
F.2d 1343,1345 (8th Or), cert denied, 495 U.S. 994 (1982). See alsoHypolite v. State, 985
S.W.2d 181, 187 (Texas App. 1998) (recognizing that no Fourth Amendment violation
occurs when a defendant disclaims ownership before an item is searched because the item
has been "abandoned" prior to the search taking place). See additional cases cited, infra at
14-15.
Here, defendant as the driver and owner of the vehicle clearly had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the vehicle. See State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256,fflf8-12,76
P.2d 178; State v. Mattison, 875 P.2d 584,587-88 (Utah 1994). Absent other circumstances,
this expectation would normally extend to objects and containers found in the vehicle. See
Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ffif 13-14. Consequently, if defendant had remained silent
when the container was found, his ownership and sole occupancy of the vehicle would
support that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle's contents.
But defendant was not silent. Instead, after the container was discovered but before
it was searched, defendant volunteered (1) that he had no knowledge of its contents, (2) that
the container was not his, but belonged to a friend, and (3) that defendant had no authority
to consent to its search (R. 36; R122: 10, 18, 21, 23, 30).
Moreover, defendant did not stop there. At the suppression hearing, he continued to
stand by his disclaimer. Defendant was on notice that the prosecutor claimed he had no
12

legitimate privacy interest in the container (R. 31-33). See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,
886-87 (Utah App.) (recognizing that where a defendant has notice of a "standing" challenge,
he carries the full burden to establish his legitimate expectation of privacy in the place and
object searched), cert denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). Yet, in testifying, defendant
never claimed ownership of the container (R122: 27-33). Nor did he claim any authority
over it or explain the nature of his possession of it (id.). Instead, defendant argued that the
mere presence of any object in his vehicle established his legitimate expectation of privacy
in the object (R122: 42 & 51).
Defendant is incorrect. Mere presence or possession alone does not establish a
legitimate expectation of privacy. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,91-92 (1980);
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980). Rather, a defendant bears the burden
to show that his actions, conduct, and words manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.
See State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, If 10, 92 P.3d 167 (recognizing that a defendant's
failure to establish a subjective expectation of privacy necessarily results "in conclusion that
no legitimate expectation of privacy exists"), cert, denied, 106 P.3d 743 (2004); see State v.
Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah App. 1993) (recognizing that a defendant cannot rely on
mere possession to satisfy his burden of proving "standing").
Because defendant mistakenly presumes that possession alone compels a finding of
privacy, he relies solely on his possession to negate the trial court's finding. See Br.Aplt. at
26. Defendant, however, is obligated to marshal all evidence in support of a finding and then
show why, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, the evidence is insufficient to
13

support it. See Save Our Canyons v. Bd. of Adjustment, 2005 UT 285, f 16, _ P.3d

;

Earl, 2004 UT App 163, f 11. Here, defendant fails to acknowledge that while the deputy
asked what was in the container, defendant's response went farther than the deputy's
question (R122: 10). Defendant not only responded that he did not know what was in the
container, but also volunteered that he did not own the container, that it belonged to a friend,
and that he had no authority to consent to its search (R. 36; R122: 16, 18, 21, 23, 29-30).
Defendant only minimally acknowledges that his disclaimer preceded the search and that he
identified another person as the owner. See Br.Aplt. at 9 & 26. Yet, both facts are
significant. See, e.g., United States v. Rush, 890 F.2d 45, 48-49 (7th Cir. 1989); Hypolite,
985 S.W.2d at 187. Most egregiously, defendant fails to acknowledge that even at the
suppression hearing, he never claimed an interest in or authority over the container.
Compare Br.Aplt. at 9-10, with R122: 27-33. Yet, again, this fact is significant. See, e.g.,
State v. Roister, 869 P.2d 993,995 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that no expectation of privacy
is established when the defendant never claimed an interest in a package). Defendant's
omission and minimization of the facts justify summary rejection of his argument. See Save
Our Canyons, 2005, UT App 285, f 16.
Even if the merits are considered, the trial court's finding that defendant lacked a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the container is fully supported by the evidence and is
consistent with existing case law. See Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1345-46 (8th Cir. 1982)
(recognizing that an affirmative disclaimer precludes a legitimate expectation of privacy
unless the defendant establishes that other evidence establishes that a constitutional privacy
14

interest exists). Accord United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 546 (4th Cir.), cert,
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2534 (2005); United States v. Garcia, 849 F.2d 917, 919 (5th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Peters, 194 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1174
(2000); Rush, 890 F.2d at 48; United States v. Washington, 197 F.3d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir.
1999); United States v. Vetch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S.
946 (1982); United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 1570, 1574 (11th Cir. 1988); State v. Ross,
49 S. W.2d 83 3,841 -42 (Tenn. 2001) (all recognizing that an affirmative disclaimer normally
precludes establishment of a legitimate expectation of privacy).
Moreover, even if, arguendo, the trial court erred in finding no expectation of privacy,
defendant has not adequately challenged the trial court's alternative ruling that the disclaimer
did not revoke his otherwise voluntary prior consent (R. 36) (Add. B). See State v. Green,
2004 UT 76,ffij11-15, 99 P.3d 820 (discussing briefing requirements of rule 24, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure). Defendant notes that an objective standard applies in determining
the scope of a consent to search. See Br.Aplt at 24 (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248
(1991)). He then in a single conclusory sentence asserts that a "'typical reasonable person'
would understand that the Defendant did not give Deputy Haney permission to search the
container in his truck." See Br.Aplt. at 25. This is insufficient to show error in the trial
court's interpretation of defendant's statements. See Green, 2004 UT 76, *f 13 (recognizing
that proper briefing requires "not just bald citation to authority but development of that
authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority").
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The trial court correctly recognized that defendant did not affirmatively consent to the
search of the container when he claimed it was his friend's (R. 36). But no such additional
consent was necessary here. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252 (recognizing that a second consent
to search a container is not necessary if a general consent has been given to search the area
where the container is found). Given the objective facts and the totality of the circumstances,
the court legitimately found that defendant's disclaimer of authority was not a revocation of
his prior consent, but simply an acknowledgment that, consistent with his claim that he had
no ownership or authority over the container, he could not authorize its search (R. 36). See
United States v. Kimona, 383 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that scope of
consent is a factual determination, which on appeal must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the trial court's finding). See also State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Utah
1990) (recognizing that determination of whether consent was given is a question of fact);
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136-37 (Utah App. 1991) (same).
In sum, the trial court properly found that defendant could not have it both ways. He
could not claim that the container belonged to his friend and that he had no authority over it
while at the same time claim that defendant had the authority to limit its search.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial
court's denial of the motion to suppress and, thereby, defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this _ ^ r day of August, 2005.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing brief of
Plaintiff/Appellee were delivered by [ ] hand [ "Tmail to JOHN T. CAINE, RICHARDS
CAINE & ALLEN, 2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 300, Ogden, UT 84401, this
August, 2005.

I

Christine F. Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A
Constitutional Provisions,
Statutes, & Rules

Addendum A

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE]
Rev.Stl933, 103-36-1, 105-17-3, 105-22-15.
State v. Jensen, 1934, 83 Utah 452, 30 P.2d 203.
Criminal Law <§=» 261(2)
*

n

i

e a
^
Whatever constitutional right accused may
have had to know charges upon which he had
been arrested, such rights were not infringed by
delay of some 12 hours between his incarceration in drunk tank and his arraignment the
following morning for murder committed in the
drunk tank. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Bennett v.

Rule 11
Passic, 1976, 545 F2d 1260. Arrest <3=* 70(2);
Criminal Law <®=* 264
4. Waiver
By announcing his readiness for trial and
proceeding to trial without any form of objec-'
t i o n t 0 the charges of the statement made by
clerks to effect that defendant had entered a not
guilty plea, and further by allowing a full trial
on the merits as if a plea of not guilty had been
entered, defendant effectively waived his right
to a formal arraignment State v. Peterson,
1984, 681 P,2d 1210. Criminal Law <&» 264

RULE 11. PLEAS
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea, of riot
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cros$-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the.
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or,
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
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(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make
a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense* or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and
the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
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(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record
as a whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this
rule \s not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1,
2001, November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005.]
Advisory Committee Note
These amendments are intended to reflecl: current law without any substantive
changes. The addition of a requirement
for a rinding of a factual basis in section
(e)(4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and is in
accordance with prior case law. E.g.
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah
1983). The rjle^now c ^ l i d d y ^ g n ^ s

ration of plea affidavits can save the court
time, eliminate some of the monotony of
rote recitations of rights waived by pleadm g guilty, and allow a more focused and
p r o bing inquiry into the facts of the ofrelationship of the law to those
f e n s e > ±e
kn0wingly
factS;
and whether ^
pha
is
and voluntarily entered.
These benefits

U . r 2s! ? ! S°St S T T l E d ^ d 162
(1970), and sets forth the factual basis
required for those pleas. E.g. Willed; v.
Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992).
The amendments explicitly recognize
that plea affidavits, where used, may properly be incorporated into the record when
the trial court determines that the defendant has read (or been read) the affidavit,
understands its contents, and acknowledges the contents. State v. Maguire, 830
P.2d 216 (Utah 1991). Proper incorpo-

^ . c o n t i ^ n t ° i ^ ^ f *f considered
™ e W of t h e a f d a ^ ^ t h e d e f e n d a f
*nd P r o f r c a r e b? J e t n a l c ° u r t to ver1^
that s u c h a r e v i e w h a s actuall
y occurred.
The
^ ^ paragraph of section (e) clarines that
the trial court may, but need not,
advise defendants concerning collateral
consequences of a guilty plea. The failure
to so advise does not affect the validity of a
plea. State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303
(Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d
13 (Utah 1995).
r

Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Owens, The Case Against Plea-Bargaining, 1
Utah B J. 8 (Nov. 1988).
Library References
Criminal Law <3=>264, 267 to 301, 625.10.
C.J S. Criminal Law §§ 362 to 363, 365 to
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110k264;
418,453,555.
110k267toll0k301; 110k625.10.
United States Code Annotated
Transfer for plea and sentence, see FRCRP Rule 20.

United States Supreme Court
Guilty plea,
In general

Challenges and prejudice requirement,
see HiU v
- Lockhart, U.S.Ark.1985, 106
S Ct. 366, 474 U.S. 52, 88 L.Ed.2d 203.
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

A m e n d m e n t IV. Search and seizure
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Addendum B
Memorandum Decision Denying
Defendant's Motion to Suppress

Addendum B

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DliPlKcT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, p^F^f^^AfeCirlENT

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

Case No. 021904753

vs.
Ernie W. Jones
District Judge

CASPER DUNKEL,

Defendant.

APR 2 5 2003

Defendant's motion to suppress came on for hearing before the Honorable Ernie Jones on
April H 2003. The State was represented by Attorney Brandon Maynard. The defendant was present
and represented by Attorney Deven Coggins. The Court heard testimony from Officer Steve Haney,
Officer Brent Butler and Casper Dunkel. The Court reviewed the memorandums of law and heard
the arguments of counsel. The Court enters the following findings:
1. The defendant was stopped by Deputy Haney for a traffic violation.
2. The defendant appeared to be disoriented. He had droopy eyes, thick tongue, slurred
speech and was slow and confused.
3. Deputy Haney is a DRE (Drug Recognition Expert) and thought the defendant was under
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the influence of drugs.
4. The defendant admitted he had used Xanax earlier in the day.
5. The defendant failed several field sobriety tests conducted by Officer Haney.
6. Officer Haney asked the defendant if he could search the car for drugs. The defendant
gave the officer permission to search.
7. Officer Haney found a large blue plastic storage container in the trunk of the vehicle.
8. The defendant said he did not own the blue container.
9. The defendant said he could not give permission to search the blue container because he
did not own it.
10. Officer Haney opened the container and found drugs and drug paraphernalia inside.
11. The defendant claims there was no consent to search the container.
12. The State argues that the defendant gave consent to search the vehicle, or in the
alternative, the defendant lacks standing to challenge the search because the defendant claims no
ownership of the container.
13. The Court finds that the defendant did not revoke his consent to search the vehicle.
14. The defendant said, "I do not own the container. The container belongs to a friend. I
cannot give permission to search it."
15. The defendant was not revoking his consent to search.
16. The defendant was claiming that since he does not own the container, he cannot give
permission to search it. The defendant was claiming he does not have authority from the owner to
grant the search.
17. The Court finds that the defendant does not have standing to suppress the contents of the
Page 2 of 4

036

container because the defendant claims he doesnk own the container.
18. The Court will deny defendant's motion to suppress.
19. The State will prepare an order consistent with this decision.

Dated this 2 - 5 of

ERNIE JONES
DISTRICT COURT
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2003.

iGE

State vs. Dunkel,
Case #021904753

Certificate of Mailing:
I hereby certify that on the £j^_ of April, 2003,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing order to
counsel, as follows:

^ft\

^Y
^ K
^

Brandon Maynard
Deputy Weber County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
2380 Washington Blvd., Ste 230
Ogden, UT 84401
DevenCoggins
Attorney for Defendant
289 24th Street, Ste 150
Ogden, UT 84401

ii

. Woodring
sad Deputy Ccfciirt Clerk

P a g e 4 of
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Addendum C
Conditional Plea Agreement

Addendum C

Tfrffi-fiBBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC., Jj<tX<-r\ J "
(Z&ff/hj
^F-WEBbKCuUNl x, S1 MJb UF UlAH
Sr\lcX^, Co^fm/
$ /^rre*i4 /•£.
•2562~Wasnington JBoulevafd
asei
•egden, UUiL 3440T
Telephone (801)392=8247
Ea^gO 1)334-7275
CO 3>IMIM2Mb23
A If: ti<|

___.

... . _ ^

ay*.si- *t /sz>

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTI^QXCQURT ,
^WEBERCOUNTY,LSTATE^6FUTAH
_
STATE OF UTAH

.V

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. Obd^Of

tl^s,p<jr

ti\tcho>*.i

'DVKLL.II

+U-—

7S~?
OCT

Judge \Jo/i<-3

C A

^^W?

Defendant.

I, C^sfoT Al/fcLcl Pu*kit( TIT, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights;
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

A.

DEGREE

/°F

PUNISHMENT
MIN/MAX AND/OR
MINIMUM MANDATORY

JT-//&

vs>?/oJ/o.ooo

B.

D.

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading
guilty (or no contest).

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

a>/fk /-Ac
lahrcJkofy

ij\kj\f-

in

~\&C^*4
er\Gc^**-.

}r\

<sy

rJahJc^hHA*.

op-trcJ-io £L

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes.) I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do no dispute or contest) that the
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):
J=

hA
die)

/OsSS^SS
possess

l^k^cJror?i
/^hr-cjfro*f

rtz*atp/^en^ £>cT
ttacf/^enr

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no
contest) I will give up all the following rights:
COUNSEL: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that I
might later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's
service to me.
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I
have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is T\j^^
(Z<*9f/i£
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s).

.

JURY TRIAL. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

I know that if I were to

have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) by attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity
to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call

witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State
would pay those costs.
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

I know that if I

were to have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no on could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I
also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF. I know that if I do not plead

guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must
be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge,
I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
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CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA
POTENTIAL PENALTIES, I

know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a
mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I
also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS.

I know that if there is more than one

crime involved, the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime
that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or
no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the Court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s)(is/are not) the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:

<^r^rvuM.>x

ouf~ o(r

<d.\j<>{ody- f>cr\V in*
cc,pp<^)^
TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know that any cnarge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecution attorney are not binding
on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge
may do are not binding on the Judge.
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
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contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am 57 years of age. I have attended school through the j&. Grade. I can read and
understand the English Language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I will be allowed to
withdraw my plea only if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after
sentencing for any reason.
DATED

this ^ ^

day of

Oc^btf

2003

.

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for Co-^p^r fViic^J
£hrJj^\ JZZL, the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's
criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

ATTORN^YTOR DEFENDANT

BARNOT

yyo'h
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against C-&^?PCJT
Mt^Mx^l OC^A^IJ ijt^ , defendant. I have reviewed this statement of defendant and find that
the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered
defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which
the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

BAR NO. &57o

/

ORDER

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and base on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily made.
that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s)
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

DATED

this 2-^2-davof

&

,200 3

.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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